Moqtada al-Sadr is what we’d call a ‘cute hoor’ – we’d also call him a ‘bad bastard’ but his announcement of a 6 month truce by his Mahdi army is a smart move if he can make it stick. In the old ‘Scarlet Pimpernel’ novels, it was referred to as a ‘policy of masterly inactivity’.
His stated reason for the truce is to reorganise his army, and that makes sense. It allows him to purge troublemakers and bring everyone in line with HQ – and that is always a problem for irregular forces. Indeed, the ‘GHQ debate’ is one of the big issues in the historiography of the Irish War of Independence. It will allow him time to recruit and train new fighters, and resupply (probably from Iran), establishing new caches of weapons and ammunition. It will also allow his units to fade from the radar of the western forces in Iraq – if the Mahdi army is not in action, they are not under pressure and can be more circumspect in their operations. If his men are not mounting operations, they are not drawing down counter-insurgency operations on their people, so it will be popular with his supporters. It allows him to secure his base areas, and gives him political capital and the time to spend it.
If it is good news for his side, it is bad for the West and their clients. Apart from all the benefits the Mahdi army gains, at the operational level, western and government forces which are overstretched will naturally tend to mount fewer operations in peaceful areas, and focus on trouble-spots. They risk quietly ceding a measure of control to al-Sadr’s faction in his strongholds. With less interaction with his faction, western units rotating between areas of operation will lose touch with al-Sadr’s men, his bases and his modus operandi. At the strategic level, the reduced violence overall will strengthen calls to pull out western forces, even though the violence in some areas will still be as bad if not worse. If al-Sadr manages to make his truce hold for 6 months – and that would be a major demonstration of his power over his supporters – he can be sure that by then he will be facing significantly reduced western troop levels and internal opposition which has worn itself down.
Six months is February 2008. By then, in the US Republican party Presidential hopefuls will want to get most of their men home and try to declare a victory in time for the election. I think it is unlikely that al-Sadr will be able to hold his truce that long, but if it does, he may himself with some unlikely allies – after all, if Martin McGuinness can be Deputy First Minister to Ian Paisley in Northern Ireland. That was on the back of a much longer truce and peace process, but it all goes to show how the truce, how ‘non-war’ has become a valuable tactic in the armoury of the irregular fighter.
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